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1 The original framework of the unemployment 
compensation system is contained in the Social 
Security Act, which was signed into law by 
President Franklin Roosevelt in 1935. 
2 The benefit level is also subject to a cap. The 
weekly maximum ranges from $200 to $600 
across states. Because of the cap, the average 
replacement ratio is roughly 50 percent. 
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he U.S. labor market has remained weak 
in recent years, even though the overall 
economy itself has started to grow again after 
the deep recession. In response to the weak 
labor market conditions, the U.S. government has greatly 
expanded the entitlement period of unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits. In this article, Shigeru Fujita 
reviews some of the academic literature on the economic 
effects of UI benefits. On the one hand, UI can improve 
people’s well-being because it helps them avoid a large 
drop in consumption in the face of job losses when job 
losers do not have enough savings. On the other hand, 
there is a concern that it might produce an adverse 
effect on the incentive to look for a job. The author 
covers leading theoretical as well as empirical studies, 
which are useful in evaluating the recent expansion of 
unemployment insurance benefits.  
deep recession. For example, in the 
fourth quarter of 2009, the average 
unemployment rate was at a double-
digit level, a level we have not seen 
since the early 1980s, even though real 
GDP grew by more than 5 percent. 
One of the main policy reactions to 
painful developments in the labor 
market has been the expansion of 
unemployment insurance. 
The unemployment insurance 
(UI) system constitutes one of 
the major components of the 
social security programs in the 
U.S.1 It provides income (and thus 
consumption) protection for those 
who have lost their jobs involuntarily. 
During “normal” times, unemployment 
insurance benefits are provided 
through the regular unemployment 
compensation (UC) program, which 
is funded and administered at the 
state level. Regular benefits, which 
are paid weekly, replace 50 to 80 
percent of pre-unemployment earnings 
and last 26 weeks in the majority of 
states.2 During economic downturns, 
however, the federal government 
often provides additional support by 
extending UI benefits. Especially in 
the last few years, the U.S. government 
has greatly extended the duration of 
benefits as a means to combat the 
surmounting joblessness. As of the 
summer of 2010, unemployed workers 
who reside in states with a relatively 
high unemployment rate are entitled to 
receive UI benefits up to 99 weeks (26 
weeks of regular benefits and 73 weeks 
of extended benefits).  
Given the painful nature of job 
losses, the merits of UI benefits are 
often taken for granted in public policy 
discussions. In this article, I will review 
some of the academic literature on the Business Review  Q4  2010   21 www.philadelphiafed.org
economic effects of UI benefits. This is 
useful for evaluating the expansions of 
the UI system in recent years. 
First, UI can improve people’s 
well-being because it helps them avoid 
large drops in consumption in the 
face of job losses: The government 
provides an insurance against job loss. 
There is, however, a concern that 
it might produce an adverse effect 
on the incentive to look for a job. 
That is, UI benefits could cause job 
seekers to put less effort into searching 
for a job, consequently raising the 
unemployment rate. Some researchers 
have argued that this incentive effect 
is large, given the observation that 
the rate of exit from unemployment at 
the time of expiration of UI benefits 
increases noticeably. An important 
issue here is that the increase in the 
exit rate from unemployment can be 
driven by the fact that the worker 
is simply dropping out of the labor 
force, thereby losing eligibility for 
UI benefits. This phenomenon can 
complicate the interpretation of the 
incentive effect. Other researchers 
also point out the possibility that UI 
benefits enhance a firm’s incentive to 
create more jobs. Below, I will lay out 
these arguments in detail.
Before getting into the detailed 
discussion, let’s first briefly review 
recent developments regarding UI 
benefits and the U.S. labor market.  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
DURING THE GREAT 
RECESSION
As mentioned above, regular 
unemployment insurance benefits 
typically last 26 weeks. However, 
the federal government often enacts 
extensions of UI benefits during 
economic downturns. There are two 
types of federal emergency programs. 
The first is called the extended benefit 
(EB) program, which is permanently 
authorized, meaning that the 
extension is triggered automatically 
whenever the state unemployment 
rate reaches a certain level. It provides 
additional weeks of unemployment 
benefits up to a maximum of either 13 
weeks or 20 weeks, depending on the 
state.
The second type is a federal 
program that Congress enacts 
temporarily during downturns. 
The latest program of this type, 
the Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation program (EUC08), 
represents the eighth time Congress 
has created such a program.3 EUC08 
was signed into law in June 2008. 
Initially, the maximum entitlement 
period under this program was 13 
weeks, but it has been extended several 
times since then. As of July 2010, 
EUC08 provides extended benefits 
for up to 53 weeks. This means that, 
combining the regular benefit and 
the two emergency programs, an 
unemployed worker is entitled to 
UI benefits for up to 99 weeks. (See 
The Chronology of the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Program 
(EUC08) for details.). 
Historically speaking, the scale 
of the extensions during the current 
downturn is very large compared 
with the extensions enacted in the 
past. During most of the post-WWII 
recessions, Congress has implemented 
federal emergency programs, but these 
programs typically provided benefits 
for a total of around 60 weeks.4 Given 
past experience, the duration of UI 
eligibility in the most recent downturn 
(that is, a total of 99 weeks) is quite 
generous. 
Figure 1 plots the number of UI 
recipients since December 2007, the 
start of the Great Recession. This 
includes those who are covered under 
the regular state programs as well as 
those covered by the federal extension 
programs. As can be seen from the 
figure, the number of claimants has 
increased steadily since the start of 
the recession.  One noticeable trend 
is the increase in the number of those 
covered under the emergency programs 
— it has more than doubled since the 
beginning of 2009. Because workers 
can be covered by the emergency 
programs only after state UI benefits 
are exhausted, the increase in the 
number of federal UI recipients implies 
that long-term unemployment is 
increasing. 
Figure 2 confirms this trend 
from a separate data series based 
on the Current Population Survey. 
The figure presents the total number 
of unemployed and those who are 
unemployed for 27 weeks or longer. 
From this figure, we can see that the 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
is rising rapidly.5
Historically speaking, 
the scale of the 
extensions during the 
current downturn is 
very large compared 
with the extensions 
enacted in the past. 
3 Congress created federal programs in 1958, 
1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008. 
See the article by Julie Whittaker for details of 
these programs. 
4 Again, see the article by Julie Whittaker for 
details of the previous programs.
5 Comparing the total number of benefit recipi-
ents and unemployment allows us to see that 
a substantial number of unemployed workers 
do not receive UI benefits. The main reason is 
that some workers are not qualified to receive 
them: To be eligible, workers must have at least 
20 weeks of full-time insured employment or 
the equivalent amount of work at insured wages 
during the previous 12-month period.These empirical observations 
underscore the importance of 
reconsidering the effects of UI benefits 
on current labor market conditions. 
Now let’s move on to the economics of 
UI benefits. 
A SIMPLE SEARCH MODEL
An economic model called a 
“search model,” pioneered by John 
McCall and others, is often used to 
analyze the decisions facing a job 
seeker. In this model, the worker 
receives occasional random job offers. 
How often the worker receives an offer 
depends on how hard he looks for a 
job. Once the offer has arrived, the 
worker decides whether to accept or 
reject it. 
One of the key implications of 
this model is that higher UI benefits 
lead to a longer duration of job search. 
The reason is that the worker puts less 
effort into searching for a job because 
higher benefits mean that he has 
less to lose from being unemployed.  
Furthermore, he may hold out for a 
higher-wage job before accepting an 
offer, since higher benefits lower the 
cost of being out of work. This means 
that the arrival of an acceptable offer 
becomes less likely (that is, the chance 
that the worker rejects the job offer is 
higher), and thus, the waiting time in 
the unemployment pool is longer. In 
this simple model, the reduction of the 
search effort caused by the increased 
benefit level is often called the moral 
hazard effect.6  
An important thing to remem-
ber here is that this simple model is 
designed to focus on the incentives to 
search for a job, omitting from consid-
eration many issues that are relevant in 
reality. In particular, workers who have 
no savings at the time of job loss may 





Source: Department of Labor
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey
6 In more elaborate models, it can be misleading 
to label the decline in the effort level as moral 
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experience a large drop in consump-
tion. Moreover, if the economy is not 
producing many jobs, it will be difficult 
to exit unemployment by becoming 
employed rather than dropping out 
of the labor force. In these cases, UI 
benefits can improve the economy’s 
welfare, offsetting the negative incen-
tive effect. I will come back to these 
issues later. But for now, let’s take this 
simple model as a useful benchmark. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES FOR 
TESTING THE MORAL 
HAZARD EFFECT
Is there empirical evidence that 
moral hazard is a serious problem of UI 
benefits? A seminal study by Robert 
Moffitt tests the implication of the 
search model. He looks at how the 
unemployment exit rate (the rate at 
which a worker exits from the unem-
ployment pool) changes right before 
UI benefits are exhausted, exploiting 
variations of maximum entitlement pe-
riods across states and across individu-
als within states. For example, imagine 
that two workers who reside in two 
different states have the same charac-
teristics such as gender and education 
but have different unemployment exit 
rates. We can associate the difference 
in the exit rates with the differences in 
the generosity of UI benefits.7 Moffitt 
uses a high-quality data set collected 
by state UI offices, which covers the 
period between 1978 through the first 
quarter of 1983. Note that this is an-
other period in which federally funded 
extended benefits were available. More 
specifically, Congress enacted the 
Federal Supplementary Compensation 
(FSC) program in the fall of 1982, 
which, combined with the regular 
benefit and the benefit under the EB 
program, provided UI benefits for more 
than 60 weeks.8
The Chronology of the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Program (EUC08)
A
s mentioned in the main text, the 
EUC08 was originally signed into law in 
June 2008 but has been expanded several 
times since then. Below is the chronology 
of EUC08. 
June 30, 2008. The EUC08 program was intro-
duced. The maximum duration of the extended benefit 
under this program was 13 weeks. It was set to expire on 
March 28, 2009. The expiration date is when the program 
stops accepting new claimants. The existing claimants 
can continue receiving benefits until the entitlement 
period is over.
November 21, 2008. The maximum entitlement 
period was extended from 13 weeks to 20 weeks. Tier II 
of benefits was introduced, providing up to an additional 
13 weeks of benefits for those who worked in states with 
a total unemployment rate of at least 6 percent. It was set 
to expire on March 28, 2009. After this date, the program 
would no longer accept new claimants and existing claim-
ants in Tier I cannot move to Tier II. 
February 17, 2009. As part of the American Eco-
nomic Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the expiration 
date of EUC08 was extended to December 26, 2009. It 
also included a provision to pay an additional $25 weekly 
benefit for those receiving benefits under the EUC08. 
November 6, 2009. The duration of the EUC08 
program was substantially expanded. Tier III and Tier 
IV were introduced. The Tier I benefit continues to be 
up to 20 weeks. The Tier II benefit was expanded to 14 
weeks from 13 weeks and no longer depended on a state’s 
unemployment rate. The new Tier III benefit  provided 
up to 13 weeks to those workers in states with an average 
unemployment rate of 6 percent or higher. The new Tier 
IV benefit may be provided up to an additional six weeks 
if the state unemployment rate is at least 8.5 percent. 
The expiration date stayed the same as before (December 
26, 2009). Again, after this date, the program would no 
longer accept new claimants, and existing claimants in 
the lower tier cannot move to the next tier.  
December 19, 2009. The expiration date was ex-
tended to February 28, 2010. 
March 2, 2010. The expiration date was extended to 
April 5, 2010.
April 15, 2010. The expiration date was extended to 
June 2, 2010. 
July 22, 2010. The expiration date was extended to 
November 30, 2010.
7 Similarly, there can be differences in the 
generosity of the benefits even across workers 
within the same state.    
8 Since the FSC was enacted late in Moffitt’s 
data set, his analysis focuses on the workers who 
were receiving the benefits for at most 39 weeks. 24   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
FIGURE 3
Median Duration of Unemployment
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey
The key finding is that there 
is a large spike in the exit rate from 
unemployment at the time UI benefits 
expire. Using a statistical technique 
called a regression analysis, Moffitt 
translates this large spike as indicating 
that, on average, a one-week extension 
of benefits leads to an increase in the 
duration of unemployment of 0.15 
week. Using the same administrative 
data set, a study by Lawrence Katz and 
Bruce Meyer and one by Meyer extend 
Moffitt’s work and find a similar spike 
in the exit rate at the time benefits are 
exhausted.  
Figure 3 presents the median 
duration of unemployment in recent 
years. It increased dramatically from 
the pre-recession level of around eight 
weeks to around 20 weeks at the end 
of 2009. This has occurred in tandem 
with the increases in the number 
of benefit claimants (see Figure 1).  
There is no doubt that the recession 
was the cause of the longer duration 
of unemployment. However, the 
literature suggests that at least part 
of the increase in the duration was 
actually caused by the extensions of 
UI benefits. Estimating “how much” 
is beyond the scope of this article, 
but The Effect of the Extension of UI 
Benefits on the Unemployment Rate: 
An Illustrative Example presents an 
example in which I calculate the effect 
of doubling the maximum benefit on 
the observed unemployment rate using 
Moffitt’s result. The exact magnitude 
of the effect aside, it seems plausible 
to say that the extensions played at 
least some part in raising the duration 
of unemployment and thus the 
unemployment rate.  
While this calculation as an 
accounting exercise is useful for 
inferring the effect of the extended 
benefits on the unemployment rate, 
there is good reason to be somewhat 
careful about its interpretation. 
In particular, should it really be 
interpreted as moral hazard? In other 
words, the presence of a spike in the 
exit rate is consistent with the moral 
hazard story, but there may be other 
stories consistent with the empirical 
observation. One alternative story 
is based on the so-called “reporting 
effect” of UI. 
REPORTING EFFECT OF UI 
To understand the reporting 
effect, note first that the earlier 
literature looks at the effects of UI on 
the “exit rate.” However, “exiting from 
unemployment” does not necessarily 
mean finding a job. In other words, 
it is possible that workers are simply 
dropping out of the labor force when 
their benefits expire. Because the data 
set used in the aforementioned studies 
is based on UI records, it does not tell 
the labor market status of workers, that 
is, whether the worker found a job or 
simply dropped out of the labor force 
after exiting from the UI system.
Is it realistic to think that workers 
are actually dropping out of the labor 
force once their benefits are exhaust-
ed? To appreciate this possibility, con-
sider the following example: A worker 
initially tried very hard to find a job, 
but after a series of unsuccessful job 
searches, he became very discouraged. 
However, to be qualified for UI bene-
fits, he is required to be “unemployed.” 
This means that he needs to fill out 
claim forms periodically and may even 
need to report to the local UI claims 
office to show that he is “actively 
looking for a job.”  Once the benefit is 
exhausted, these requirements cease 
to exist, and consequently, he officially 
exits from the unemployment pool. 
This appears to be a plausible possibil-
ity. Note that the reporting effect story 
involves little change in a worker’s 
decision around the expiration date, 
yet it induces a large change in the 
unemployment exit rate. In this sense, 
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moral hazard based on the size of the 
spike in the exit rate.9 One simple 
way to empirically distinguish them is 
to examine whether the spike in the 
unemployment exit rate is associated 
with re-employment or dropping out 
of the labor force. This is exactly what 
a recent paper by David Card, Raj 
Chetty, and Andrea Weber did. 
These authors analyzed this issue 
using a rich data set from Austria. Ac-
cording to the authors, the UI system 
in Austria is similar to the one in the 
U.S., although there are some insti-
tutional differences.  The data set is 
rich enough so that they can examine 
the effect of UI benefits on job finding 
(not just exit from unemployment). 
When they focus on the unemploy-
ment exit rate, they find a very large 
spike at the time of benefit exhaustion. 
In their sample, the jump in the exit 
rate amounts to 200 percent and is of 
similar magnitude to the one reported 
by Moffitt. However, when they con-
sider only those who are re-employed, 
the spike almost disappears. In other 
words, there is little evidence that 
people exit benefits by finding a new 
job. More specifically, Card and co-
authors find a modest increase, roughly 
20 percent, in the re-employment 
rate. They further point out that this 
modest increase in the re-employment 
rate implies that less than 1 percent of 
unemployment spells have an end date 
that is manipulated to coincide with 
the expiration of UI benefits.
Several papers look at the effects 
on re-employment rates using U.S. 
data.  A paper by Bruce Fallick, us-
ing data from the Displaced Worker 
Survey (DWS), finds that there is no 
significant difference in the job-finding 
rate after benefits have been exhaust-
ed. On the contrary, Katz and Meyer 
argue that there is a significant spike 
in the re-employment rate associated 
                                                                   
An Illustrative Example
I
n his study, Robert Moffitt estimates 
the effect of the extension of UI benefits 
on the duration of unemployment. He 
estimates that a one-week extension 
of benefits results in an increase in the 
duration of unemployment of 0.15 week, on average. 
Here, I take this estimate as given and calculate the 
effect on the unemployment rate when the benefit 
entitlement period is doubled from 26 weeks to 52 weeks. 
As mentioned in the main text and in the Chronology 
of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program 
(EUC08) on page 23, the maximum entitlement period 
in the current downturn is 99 weeks. However, a worker 
may not have known at the time he lost his job that the 
entitlement period was 99 weeks because the extension 
announcement may have come after the initial job loss. 
Furthermore, as explained in EUC08, after the expiration 
date, workers can continue to be covered under the UI 
program only up to the entitlement period of that tier. 
Given these considerations, I only look at a simple case of 
doubling the entitlement period.
  First, assume that the rate at which the average 
worker finds a job (that is, the job-finding rate) is 30 
percent per month, which implies that the duration 
of unemployment of the average worker is 3.3 months 
(approximately 13 weeks). These numbers are roughly 
consistent with empirical observations. Also assume that 
employed workers are flowing into the unemployment 
pool at a rate of 2 percent per month. In the “steady 
state,” where flows into and out of unemployment are 
equal to each other, the job-finding rate of 30 percent 
per month and the job-loss rate of 2 percent imply an 
unemployment rate of 6.25 percent. 
  Now assume that the maximum entitlement 
period is increased from 26 weeks to 52 weeks. Moffitt’s 
estimate implies that the duration of unemployment 
goes up by 3.9 weeks. This translates into a decline 
in the job-finding rate from 30 percent per month to 
approximately 24 percent. I further assume that the job-
loss rate is unaffected by the extension. The steady-state 
unemployment rate with the extended benefit entitlement 
period then becomes 7.7 percent. 
 
9 Theoretically distinguishing the two stories 
requires extending the simple search model 
discussed above along several dimensions. For 
example, the simple search model does not 
incorporate the feature that workers’ skills can 
deteriorate while they are unemployed.  In the 
model with such an extended feature, workers 
would reduce their search effort over time as 
the value of work relative to being unemployed 
declines as their skills deteriorate. In such a 
model, the increase in the re-employment rate 
right before the expiration date can be much 
smaller than that implied in the simpler search 
model. 26   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
with the exhaustion of benefits, sup-
porting the moral hazard story.10
While these data sets derived from 
surveys include information on work-
ers’ labor market status (employed, un-
employed, and out of the labor force), 
thus allowing the researchers to dis-
tinguish between the re-employment 
rate and the exit rate, the information 
in these surveys is necessarily less ac-
curate, compared with the data that 
come from UI offices. For example, the 
worker-level information regarding his 
or her maximum entitlement period 
and the actual benefit-collection pe-
riod can be subject to serious measure-
ment errors.11 
Given the limitations of these 
survey data sets (DWS and PSID), we 
can only agree with Card, Chetty, and 
Weber that “the size of the spike in 
re-employment rates at exhaustion in 
the current U.S. labor market remains 
an open question.” This is unfortu-
nate, but the argument made by Card, 
Chetty, and Weber at least gives us a 
reason to keep the reporting effect in 
mind when thinking about the positive 
relationship between unemployment 




A study by Jonathan Gruber and 
one by Raj Chetty provide another 
possible reason (other than the moral 
hazard story) for the positive relation-
ship between higher UI benefits and 
the duration of unemployment. That 
is, UI benefits work as a mechanism 
to relax the liquidity constraint of 
unemployed workers. To understand 
the idea, note first that in the simple 
search model, the wealth level of the 
worker has no implications for his 
or her search behavior. More to the 
point, it does not suppose a situation in 
which an unemployed worker accepts 
a low-paying job simply because he 
needs to put food on the table. Is the 
underlying assumption of the standard 
search model realistic? Probably not. 
Actually, there is ample empirical evi-
dence that many unemployed individu-
als do not have enough savings, and 
thus, their consumption is quite sensi-
tive to cash on hand (see, for example, 
the study by Gruber). When workers 
are subject to the liquidity constraint, 
the wealth level does have an effect 
on search behavior. In particular, UI 
benefits increase cash on hand held by 
unemployed workers to support their 
consumption. Higher benefits then 
reduce the pressure to take a low-pay-
ing job, leading to the longer duration 
of unemployment. At least for these 
workers, UI benefits work literally as 
insurance against job loss. 
Note that, as opposed to the 
moral hazard effect, the liquidity effect 
highlights the aspect of UI policy 
beneficial to the overall economy. 
The liquidity constraint limits the 
worker’s ability to take an “optimal” 
action, such as declining what may be 
a poor job match, an action he might 
have taken if he had enough savings. 
Relaxing the liquidity constraint 
through UI is then desirable from a 
policy perspective.  
Chetty empirically shows that the 
liquidity effect is sizable. Using U.S. 
labor market data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), he finds that higher UI benefits 
are associated with much lower job-
finding rates for workers with little 
wealth, while they have no noticeable 
impact on job-finding rates for workers 
with greater wealth. He then estimates 
that 60 percent of the increase in the 
duration of unemployment from higher 
UI benefits can be attributed to the 
liquidity effect. He further develops a 
simple method of calculating the econ-
omy’s welfare gains from UI. Using this 
method, he concludes that a UI system 
in which benefits replace 50 percent 
of pre-unemployment earnings for 
six months is optimal. Note that this 
“optimal” system is close to the cur-
rent U.S. system during normal times. 
Presumably, a more generous benefit 
structure is desirable during economic 
downturns,12 although answering the 
question of how much more generous 
the benefits should be during reces-
sions requires further research. 
JOB-CREATION EFFECT 
The discussion so far has focused 
on workers’ job-search behavior. Daron 
Acemoglu and Robert Shimer point 
out another welfare-improving effect of 
UI, one that works through the feed-
back effect on job creation. The au-
thors develop a model in which there 
are two types of jobs: high-productivity 
and low-productivity jobs. The high-
productivity jobs are harder to find, 
but they pay a higher wage. Similarly, 
low-productivity jobs are easier to find, 
but they pay a lower wage.
To understand how Acemoglu and 
Shimer’s model works, think of a job 
acceptance decision of a worker who 
has been offered a low-productivity job. 
Note that the trade-off is whether to 
accept this low-paying offer or to bet 
on getting an offer of a high-productiv-
ity job in the future. The latter choice 
involves giving up the income from 
10 The study by Katz and Meyer (as mentioned 
in the previous section) mainly focuses on 
unemployment exit rates, but they supplement 
their analyses by attempting to distinguish 
between re-employment and exit. They use the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 
this purpose. 
11 Another issue is that these survey data con-
tain relatively few observations. For example, 
in the Katz and Meyer study, which finds a 
sharp spike in re-employment, there are only 26 
observations at the spike.
 
12 For example, more workers may be liquidity 
constrained during economic downturns. the low-productivity job. Furthermore, 
if the worker rejects the offer, he also 
faces the risk of not getting an offer at 
all in the near future. This acceptance 
decision is based on balancing between 
the two competing effects.  In this 
situation, the higher benefit level shifts 
the balance toward looking for a high-
productivity job, turning down offers 
of low-productivity jobs.  
When the benefit level is raised, 
firms have a higher incentive to create 
high-productivity jobs, knowing that 
workers are more likely to turn down 
low-paying job offers (the job-creation 
effect). Through numerical exercises 
using this model, Acemoglu and 
Shimer show that higher UI benefits 
raise the unemployment rate mainly 
through the moral hazard effect, but 
aggregate output and welfare increase 
as a result of the positive feedback 
between workers’ willingness to look 
for high-productivity jobs and the 
creation of high-productivity jobs.13
They do not assess the empirical 
significance of this job-creation effect.  
We thus do not know how significant 
the job-creation effect is in reality. 
However, it is possible to associate the 
model’s implications with a real-world 
situation in which more generous UI 
benefits give workers some time to look 
for a high-paying job, which in turn 
has some impact on firms’ decisions to 
create such jobs. 
SUMMARY AND MISSING PIECE
In this article, I have reviewed 
some of the key findings on the 
economic effects of UI benefits. It has 
sometimes been argued that extending 
UI benefits causes adverse incentives 
for searching for a job. However, 
reporting effects complicate the 
interpretation that moral hazard effects 
predominantly account for the spike 
in the exit rate from unemployment. 
Furthermore, the arguments based 
on the liquidity and job-creation 
effects justify the positive relationship 
between the level of UI benefits and 
the duration of unemployment as 
socially desirable.  
The expansions of UI benefits 
during the most recent recession may 
be supported by the latter argument 
at least qualitatively. Unfortunately, 
the economics profession has not 
accumulated enough research that tells 
us how large the extensions should be 
during economic downturns.
Also, one important issue that 
has not been studied very much in 
the literature on UI is the interaction 
between the benefit level and human 
capital or skill depreciation. There is 
a long-standing empirical literature 
on earnings losses; those who are out 
of work for a long time tend to lose 
human capital and thus earn much less 
than they did pre-unemployment, even 
if one is lucky enough to find a job. 
Longer eligibility of UI may exacerbate 
this effect. The academic research 
examining this interaction would 
also be valuable for policymakers and 
economists. B R
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